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Abstract
Demographic transition theory is developed highlighting cultural transmission pattern as key
driver. Individuals maximize cultural fitness, i.e. rate of own cultural type absorbtion by
future generations. With low population density, one’s culture can be picked up only by own
children, thus cultural fitness equals genetic fitness, individuals allocate all energy surplus to
reproduction, and Malthusian regime occurs. With rising population density, cultural trans-
mission between non-relatives accelerates; knowledge production by an individual makes her
culture more attractive. Individuals reallocate some of energy surplus from reproduction to
knowledge production, causing technological growth. The model fits observed demographic
transition patterns.
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1. Introduction
The life history theory, a branch of theoretical biology, makes very specific predictions
about such elements of an organism’s lifecycle as the age of reproduction, fertility, and life
expectancy. All of these are shaped to maximize the population growth rate.
While for most of their history humans were seemingly no different from other species in
their effort to maximize the population rate of growth, in the last two centuries a dramatic
transformation of human life histories has occurred. Humans deter reproduction until later
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age, have fewer children, and live longer. They no longer allocate all spare resources towards
reproduction. What caused such demographic transition? Why only among humans, and
why only in the last two centuries? Clearly, an explanation must include some features of the
Homo sapiens that are non-existent in other species, and that became especially pronounced
in the last two centuries.
The abundant Economics literature on the demographic transition has virtually ignored
this logic. The reason is in the fundamental assumptions of the Economic theory: instead of
building on the Darwinian Homo Sapiens, whose goal is to maximize own trace in history,
theories are typically built on the Adam Smith’s Homo Economicus, whose primary goal
is to enjoy himself. Several economists have pointed out that, according to the Darwinian
logic, private consumption is an intermediate rather than the final good (e.g. Robson (2001),
Bergstrom (2007)). Nevertheless, this logic did not find its way into Economic Demography,
and virtually all theories of the demographic transition remain transfixed on the human as
the consumption maximizer. To explain why such a human would have any children at
all, additional bells and whistles have been attached to the consumption-centered objective
function. Becker (1960) proposes to view children as something that enters parents’ utility
along with consumption goods. Becker et al. (1990) assume that parent’s utility includes
personal consumption, as long as (with a smaller weight) that of each of their children.
Galor and Weil (2000), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) assume that parents are concerned about own
consumption as well as about aggregate income of all of their (surviving) children. Baudin
(2010) assumes that parents derive utility from own labor income, and from the fact that
their children have adopted their own (as opposed to someone else’s) views of life. Galor and
Moav (2002) assume that parents derive utility from own consumption, as well as the number
and “quality”/education of children. In their model, personal consumption enters the utility
with an exogenous weight, while the importance of the other two components is subject to
evolutionary selection. While the authors acknowledge that the same evolutionary pressure
2
should drive the weight of personal consumption down to zero, they “navigate around”
this problem by (verbally) asserting that such consumption is needed to increase individual
reproductive success; this idea is never formulated rigorously within their model.
This paper makes a case for abandoning the traditional consumption-based utility, and
modeling a human whose objectives follow logically from the Darwinian genetic-fitness-
maximizing paradigm. As mentioned above, to explain demographic transition within this
paradigm one has to highlight some unique features of the Homo sapiens. This paper em-
phasizes the role of one such suspect, namely the human ability for cultural transmission.
Culture is a set of behavioral recipes that are passed from one generation of humans to the
next, and which may differ across societies. Boyd and Richerson (1985) convincingly argue
that the human ability for cultural transmission is unprecedented; such ability strongly af-
fects the course of the evolution of mankind. Importantly, culture is not always transmitted
from parents to children: a child may pick a cultural trait from outside the family. Newson
et al. (2007) links the declining fertility to the increasing exposure of people to the “out-
side” culture: when culture is picked up primarily from parents or other close relatives, the
evolution of cultural traits parallels the evolution of genes, and cultural traits emphasizing
high fertility are favored. When the chance of picking up culture from outside is increased,
another cultural traits, prescribing lower fertility, dominate. Zakharenko (2013a) formalizes
the idea in a model.
On the empirical side, several studies indicate the link between cultural transmission
patterns and fertility. La Ferrara et al. (2012) finds that arrival of TV shows portraying
low-fertility lifestyles reduces actual fertility in Brazilian communities. Axinn and Barber
(2001); Axinn and Yabiku (2001) use the purpose-collected dataset from rural Nepal to show
that living near social places such as school (even controlling for actual school attendance),
a bus stop, or a market, in the early childhood, increases the chance of contraception use
during adulthood. The countries of Eastern Europe had a sharp decline in fertility beginning
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from around 1987, at the time of sharply increased openness to culture of Western Europe.1
The Amish community, perhaps the most culturally isolated in the United States, also has
some of the highest fertility with 7.7 children per woman (Greksa, 2002).
Zakharenko (2013a) also shows that, under mild sufficient conditions, the most successful
cultural traits are the ones that encourage their hosts to spread them around as much as
possible, i.e. maximize the “cultural fitness”. Other cultural traits (e.g. those that prescribe
the concern for personal consumption) are copied less frequently and become extinct in the
process of cultural evolution. This result is reminiscent of the “selfish meme” hypothesis
(e.g. Blackmore (2000)), but does not require the existence of memes as discrete physical
entities. This idea is employed in the theory we develop: we assume that individuals behave
in a way that maximizes their cultural fitness, i.e. the extent to which their cultural type has
been picked up by the young. The traditional for Economists concern for consumption (own
or that of others) is eliminated entirely from the objective function; personal consumption
is merely an intermediate good that reduces the rate of mortality.
While the theoretical link between fertility and cultural transmission patterns has already
been discussed in Newson et al. (2007) and Zakharenko (2013a), this paper goes beyond and
also explains the trend in the other element of demographic transition, namely declining
mortality. Additionally, the pattern of cultural transmission is endogenized, which helps to
explain why the demographic transition has happened only recently in human history. We
now proceed to explain the key ideas of the model in greater detail.
The cultural transmission process is elaborated from Zakharenko (2013a). Every individ-
ual is born to parent(s) of a specific cultural type, chooses her own cultural type immediately
after birth, and belongs to that cultural type throughout lifetime. Such assumption may not
1The socioeconomic conditions such as women’s wage or old age security, which are typically cited by
Economists as key drivers of fertility, began to change several years after the Eastern European fertility
began to decline. Moreover, the socioeconomic change was in opposite direction from what was needed to
reduce fertility according to typical Economic theories of demographic transition.
4
be the most accurate representation of actual cultural transmission, but it indeed improves
the tractability of the model. With some probability, the individual simply inherits the cul-
tural type of parents. Such probability is greater when a community is isolated so there are
few or no alternative role models; this probability decreases as the global population density
becomes higher. With the remaining probability, the newly born samples a large number
of potential role models from at large,2 and adopts the cultural type of the most culturally
attractive role model. Cultural attractiveness is stochastic, such that more knowledgeable
role models are stochastically more attractive. The knowledge produced by an individual is
a matter of choice, and can be viewed as a costly effort that enables individuals of a certain
cultural type to attract followers born to parents of other cultural types. This motive for
production of knowledge, to increase popularity of own cultural type, is non-standard in the
Economics literature (which, again, assumes that selfish individuals create knowledge only
to increase own consumption), but does have some empirical support. For example, (Mokyr,
2010, p. 90), emphasizes that “Scientists who discovered matters of significant insight to in-
dustry, such as Count Rumford, Joseph Priestley, or Humphry Davy, usually wanted credit,
not profit”. In the interpretation of the current paper, “credit” is own cultural fitness, i.e.
popularity of own cultural type.
The above assumptions about cultural transmission differ from a growing body of Eco-
nomics literature on cultural transmission commenced by Bisin and Verdier (2001). In that
line of research, individuals undertake costly effort to prevent own children from being “lost”
to other cultural types, rather than to attract followers from other cultural types. The two
approaches, by Zakharenko (2013a) and by Bisin and Verdier (2001), as well as a combi-
nation of both, yield similar qualitative results in a model that follows. We use the first
approach due to its better mathematical tractability.
2There is no geography in the model, hence all individuals are equally likely to be sampled as potential
role models.
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Individuals require energy to live and to reproduce. Energy is produced off the land,
the only factor of production. The productivity of land depends on the level of technology;
naturally, there is less land available per capita as population grows. Therefore, the level of
technology checks the maximal population size on the globe. The level of technology, in turn,
is a byproduct of knowledge produced by individuals in order to attract cultural followers.
A similar assumption was made in Zakharenko (2013b).
Part of the produced energy is utilized by individuals for own mortality prevention. The
remaining energy is divided between new births and the production of knowledge.
The model predicts that, with low population density, cultures are largely isolated, cul-
tural transmission between non-relatives is unlikely, and therefore the incentives for knowl-
edge production are low. Individuals allocate the entire energy surplus towards reproduction,
and population is limited only by the productivity of land. With little knowledge produc-
tion, land productivity remains at a low level and grows at a slow rate, which prevents the
population size and density from rising too fast.
When the population density finally becomes high enough, individuals begin to deliber-
ately invest in knowledge in order to improve their cultural success. With greater knowl-
edge production, technological progress and land productivity accelerate. A greater rate
of growth of energy production results in both increased population growth rate and in-
creased individual productivity. As the total population continues to grow, cultural fitness
becomes increasingly dependent on knowledge production, and individuals increasingly re-
allocate their energy surplus away from physical reproduction to knowledge production. As
individual productivity continues to grow, is becomes optimal for individuals to invest more
into mortality prevention and thus to live longer.
In contrast with conventional growth models which admit an infinite exponential growth
in productivity, we assume that technology eventually levels out at some maximal level.
Such assumption is motivated by the fact that we model energy production rather than
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GDP; while such production continues to grow, there is little ground to assume that global
energy production may grow indefinitely and exponentially. As the level of technology levels
out, the model predicts that both population and energy production per capita stabilize
at some (high) level. In that terminal steady state, individuals are characterized by high
life expectancy, they also limit fertility and allocate a significant proportion of their energy
surplus to the production of knowledge.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper that links endogenous
technology growth, cultural transmission, fertility, and mortality in one model. The above
mentioned Becker et al. (1990), Galor and Weil (2000), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) link fertility
to endogenous growth; the latter also features child mortality as an element of her model.
Baudin (2010) links fertility to cultural transmission patterns; fertility decline is triggered
by exogenously changing productivity. Ponthiere (2011) studies the culturally transmitted
lifestyles resulting in heterogenous mortality. Chakraborty (2004) models an endogenous
interaction between mortality and growth.
2. Model
Consider a dynamic world with continuous time, indexed by t. The world is populated
by a continuum of individuals, each belonging to one of cultural types. The number of
cultural types is countable and is equal to N . Note that the distribution of individuals across
cultural types need not be perfectly correlated with the distribution across genetic types:
individuals from the same cultural type may differ genetically (e.g. belong to different races);
individuals from the same biological family may belong to different cultures (e.g. practice
different religions). Throughout the model, we keep track only of distribution of individuals
across cultural types. The set of all individuals belonging to a cultural type n at time t
is denoted Ln(t); the measure of that set (i.e. the population size) is denoted Ln(t). By
L(t) = ∪n=1...NLn(t) we denote the set of all individuals alive at t; L(t) =
∑
n Ln(t) is the
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total population at time t.
2.1. Objective function
In the world of competition among cultural types, survival necessitates maximization of
the cultural fitness, i.e. maximization of the share of population of a given cultural type
in the global population, which we assume to be the objective of every member of every
cultural type. This implies, in particular, that members of the same cultural types should
redistribute energy between one another if that improves the fitness of their culture. Thus,
in the model we keep track of the total energy balance for each cultural type, but disregard
individual energy balances.
Every evolutionarily successful cultural type should be adaptive, i.e. respond to perma-
nent changes in the environment such that the steady state cultural fitness is maximized.
At the same time, there is no requirement for a cultural type to be forward-looking along
a transition path from one steady-state to another: since transition lasts only for a limited
period of time, non-forward-looking behavior may survive the evolutionary selection. This
reasoning allows us to assume that decision makers treat some aggregate model parameters
such as population growth rate and personal productivity as time-invariant even when they
are not, which considerably simplifies calculation of their optimal choices.
2.2. Cultural transmission process
With some probability 1 − q, a newborn simply inherits the cultural type of her par-
ents. The parameter q ∈ [0, 1) presents the degree of cultural openness of an individual to
alternative cultures, and is assumed to be a continuous and increasing function of the global
population size: q = q(L(t)). A smaller q implies more cultural isolation. The fact that q
rises with L implies that cultural isolation decreases as the global population grows.
With the remaining probability q, the individual randomly samples a large number M of
potential role models from L(t), compares their cultural attractiveness, and adopts the type
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of the most culturally attractive individual. We now describe the sampling process and the
process that determines cultural attractiveness.
Every random draw of a potential role model is independent from another draws. The
probability of being drawn is the same for every member of L(t). The drawn individual is a
potential role model. Thus, the probability of drawing a potential role model from a cultural
type n is equal to the share of that cultural type in the global population, zn(t) =
Ln(t)
L(t)
.
The cultural attractiveness ψij ≥ 0 of every potential role model j drawn by individual
i is a realization of random variable from Frechet distribution with parameters hj ≥ 0 and
θ > 1, such that Prob(ψij < x) = e
−hjx−θ . The realizations of ψij are independent across
i, j. The parameter hj is referred to as the knowledge of j, and is endogenously determined
by individual j, prior to the role model sampling, as detailed below. The attractiveness of
an individual with a higher knowledge stochastically dominates that of an individual with
a lower knowledge. Note that, to simplify mathematical tractability, we have assumed that
knowledge is a flow rather than a stock variable, i.e. it is not accumulated over time but
depends only on instantaneous effort to produce it.
From the properties of Frechet distribution, for a given sample {j1 . . . jM} of potential
role models drawn by i, the probability that jk is the most culturally attractive is merely
hjk∑
l h
jl
. Then, the probability that i becomes a member of cultural type n, conditional on not
picking up parents’ culture and on the sample {j1 . . . jM} of potential role models, is
∑
k h
jkI(jk ∈ Ln(t))∑
k h
jk
, (1)
where I(·) is the indicator function. As M grows infinitely large, by law of large numbers,
(1) converges in probability to
hn(t)zn(t)∑
m∈1...N hm(t)zm(t)
=
hn(t)Ln(t)∑
m∈1...N hm(t)Lm(t)
, (2)
9
where
hn(t) ≡
∫
j∈Ln(t) h
j(t)dj
Ln(t)
(3)
is the average level of knowledge of type n at time t. Throughout the paper, we assume
that M is large enough so the probability of choosing type n can be approximated by (2).
According to (2), only the average level of knowledge, but not its distribution across members
of a cultural type, matters for cultural transmission. In the analysis that follows, we keep
track only of the average level hn(t) for a given cultural type.
Assuming that the number of births to type n at time t is bn(t)Ln(t) where bn(t) is referred
to as the birth rate, we can also calculate the number of individuals adopting cultural type
n at time t, gn(t)Ln(t), where gn(t) is referred to as the rate of adoption:
gn(t) = (1− q)bn(t) + q
∑
m=1...N
hn(t)Ln(t)∑
l=1...N hl(t)Ll(t)
bm(t)
Lm(t)
Ln(t)
= (1− q)bn(t) + qhn(t)
∑
m=1...N bm(t)Lm(t)∑
m=1...N hm(t)Lm(t)
= (1− q)bn(t) + qhn(t) b(t)
h(t)
, (4)
where h(t) ≡
∑
m=1...N hm(t)Lm(t)
L(t)
and b(t) ≡
∑
m=1...N bm(t)Lm(t)∑
m=1...N L(t)
are population averages of knowl-
edge and fertility, respectively. Throughout the paper, we assume that each cultural type
constitutes a small fraction of the global population, and decisions made by members of a
given cultural type have a negligible effect on h(t) and b(t).
Observe also that q = 0 implies gn(t) = bn(t), hence, for isolated cultures which have no
contact with others, knowledge production does not affect the cultural transmission process.
Observe also that, since cultural transmission by itself does not increase or decrease the
number of people, the average rate of adoption g(t) ≡
∑
m=1...N gm(t)Lm(t)∑
m=1...N L(t)
is always equal to
b(t).
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2.3. Individual lifecycle
The model of human lifecycle is simplified from Robson and Kaplan (2003a), who analyze
the unique features of a (pre-industrial) human, compared to other species, by drawing on
the lifecycle theory.
2.3.1. Production of energy
Each individual produces energy using the land, the only factor of production, which is
available in fixed stock X but with endogenously evolving productivity B(t). As the land is
divided equally between all living individuals, the per-capita energy production is equal to
y(t) =
B(t)X
L(t)
. (5)
The land productivity evolves with the production of knowledge as follows:
∂B(t)
∂t
= h(t)L(t)
(
1− B(t)
Bm
)
, (6)
where Bm is the maximum possible productivity of a unit of land, also referred to as the
limit of productivity. Knowledge creation reduces the gap between the current productivity
and its limit.
2.3.2. Use of energy
As mentioned in previous discussion, all members of a typical cultural type n share a
common goal hence can pass energy from one to another as necessary. For this reason, we
only keep track of the aggregate energy balance for n at each moment of time t. Part of
(individual) produced energy y(t) is allocated towards (individual) prevention of mortality
s(t). The remaining (aggregate) energy surplus Esn(t) ≡ (y(t)− s(t))Ln(t) is divided between
new births Ebn(t) and knowledge production E
h
n(t). We now characterize each of the three
uses in more detail.
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Each individual faces the instantaneous mortality hazard µ, a function µ : R+ → R+ of
mortality prevention effort s, with properties similar to that of Robson and Kaplan (2003b).
Specifically, µ(s) > 0, µ′(s) < 0, µ′′(s) > 0,∀s ≥ 0. We also assume µ′(0) = −∞, so there is
never a corner solution. Denote by p(t′, t) the probability of survival from time t to time t′,
we then have that p(t, t) = 1, ∂p(t
′,t)
∂t′
1
p(t′,t) = −µ(s(t′)).
It takes e0 > 0 units of energy to give birth to an individual. Thus, the birth rate at
time t is given by
bn(t) =
1
Ln(t)
Ebn(t)
e0
. (7)
A byproduct of the reproduction process is knowledge creation: every unit of energy allocated
towards reproduction results in creation of c0 > 0 units of knowledge. Thus, there is (slow)
technological progress even if the entire energy surplus is allocated towards reproduction.
Such knowledge creation can be viewed as the “learning by doing” type of knowledge.
The production of knowledge however is much more effective when resources are allocated
specifically towards that goal: every unit of energy dedicated to it results in c units of
knowledge, with c > c0. Thus, the rate of knowledge production by cultural type n is given
by
hn(t) =
1
Ln(t)
(
c0E
b
n(t) + cE
h
n(t)
)
. (8)
3. Analysis
3.1. Allocation of energy surplus
Suppose the members of a cultural type n at time t have made their decisions about
mortality prevention s(t), and face the dilemma of dividing their energy surplus Esn(t) be-
tween new births Ebn(t) and knowledge production E
h
n(t). The division is made in a way that
maximizes the population growth rate of the cultural type, (4), subject to (7) and to (8).
Such maximization yields one of the three following solutions (dropping the time argu-
ment): (i) if Ln
∂gn
∂Ebn
= (1 − q) 1
e0
− q(c − c0) bh > 0, then no energy is allocated to knowledge
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production, and the entire energy surplus is allocated towards new births, thus Ebn = E
s
n
and bn =
Esn
e0
; (ii) if ∂gn
∂Ebn
= 0, the returns to both types of energy allocation are the same,
and any allocation is growth-maximizing; (iii) if ∂gn
∂Ebn
< 0, all of energy surplus is allocated
to knowledge production, and no new births are made.
Since the above optimal solution is the same for all cultural types, we can draw infer-
ence on the aggregate birth rate b and knowledge production h for each of the three above
outcomes. The outcome (i) implies
b =
1
e0
∑
nE
s
nLn
L
, (9)
h = c0
∑
nE
s
nLn
L
. (10)
Such outcome will take place iff q ≤ c0
c
. In other words, when cultures are sufficiently iso-
lated from each other and cultural transmission is mostly vertical (from parents to children),
a Malthusian economy occurs where the entire energy surplus is allocated towards repro-
duction. The outcome (ii) occurs when q > c0
c
, i.e. the rate of “oblique” (i.e. between
non-relatives) cultural transmission is high enough. Equality of ∂gn
∂Ebn
to zero implies that
b = (1− q) c
c− c0
1
e0
∑
nE
s
nLn
L
, (11)
h = qc
∑
nE
s
nLn
L
. (12)
In other words, only a fraction of the energy surplus is allocated towards reproduction; the
rest is spent on deliberate knowledge creation. Finally, outcome (iii) implies that b = 0,
which makes it impossible for ∂gn
∂Ebn
to be negative for any q < 1. Thus, we conclude that such
outcome can be ruled out.
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3.2. Lifecycle decisions
We assume that individuals make their decisions regarding mortality prevention s(t)
under the assumptions that (i) there is no population growth, and that (ii) the individual
energy production y(t) is time-invariant, as well. As shown below, during the pre-industrial
(“Malthusian”) era, population growth is negligible so (i) is close to the truth, while (ii) is
exactly true. In the time limit, as the technology B(t) reaches its maximum, both (i) and
(ii) are true. Thus, such assumptions are irrelevant only along the transition path from the
former to the latter; suboptimal decisions along a transition path do not necessarily lead to
extinction of cultural types and thus are empirically plausible.
The objective of every individual is to contribute to the growth rate of own cultural type,
which in turn requires to produce as much lifetime energy surplus as possible.3 The energy
surplus produced by all living members of a cultural type is pooled and is allocated toward
creation of cultural followers, either by birth or by attraction from other cultural types.
The expected energy surplus produced during remaining lifetime by an individual at time
t, who faces (perceived constant) individual output y is then
V (y, sE(·, t)) ≡
∫ ∞
t
pE(t′, t)
[
y − sE(t′, t)] dt′, (13)
where pE(t′, t) (sE(t′, t)) is the expected survival probability (mortality prevention effort) at
time t′ for an individual making decisions at time t. The V (·) is being maximized subject to
constraints pE(t, t) = 1, ∂p
E(t′,t)
∂t′
1
pE(t′,t) = −µ(sE(t′, t)). As the problem is (perceived) time-
invariant, individuals expect that their mortality prevention effort will not change over time:
sE(t′, t) = s,∀t′ ≥ t, for some s. Then, pE(t′, t) = exp(−µ(s)(t′ − t)), and the expected
lifetime energy surplus can then be shown to be V (y, s) = y−s
µ(s)
. Maximization of the latter
3With population growth, a unit of energy produced earlier is more valuable than the one produced later,
because the former results in a greater impact on the share of one’s cultural type in the global population.
We disregard this phenomenon due to perceived zero population growth rate.
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with respect to s yields the optimal mortality prevention effort s(y),
∂V (y, s(y))
∂s
= − 1
µ(s(y))
[1 + µ′(s(y))V (y, s(y))] = 0. (14)
With µ′(·) < 0, it must be that a positive energy surplus is produced, V (y, s(y)) > 0, thus
s(y) < y. We can also show that the second derivative is negative: ∂
2V (y,s)
∂s2
= −µ′′(s(y))
µ(s(y))
V (y, s(y)) <
0, so the second-order condition of optimality is indeed met. Additionally, we calculate the
marginal response of optimal s to changes in y, ∂s(y)
∂y
= −
∂2V (y,s)
∂y∂s
∂2V (y,s)
∂s2
= − µ′(s)
µ′′(s)(y−s) > 0. Not
surprisingly, a greater individual productivity results in a greater mortality prevention effort.
3.3. Determining the aggregates
Next, we proceed to the analysis of the path of the economy through time. The model
allows to track such parameters as population size, technology level, fertility, and mortality.
We divide the time dimension into three periods: (i) the Malthusian epoch, when the cultural
transmission parameter q is below the threshold c0/c, (ii) the demographic transition period,
and (iii) the time limit, when the economy stabilizes in a steady state.
3.3.1. The Malthusian economy
The Malthusian economy occurs when global population is small enough so that q(L(t)) ≤
c0
c
and the entire energy surplus is allocated to reproduction. Because of that, population is
checked only by the available resources, and individual productivity y(t) remains at a lowest
possible level needed for reproduction. The mortality prevention effort is low, hence life
expectancy is low, too.
The evolution of the technology level is characterized by (cf. (6),(5))
rB(t) =
∂B(t)
∂t
1
B(t)
= h(t)
L(t)
B(t)
(
1− B(t)
Bm
)
= c0(y(t)− s(y(t)))L(t)
B(t)
(
1− B(t)
Bm
)
(15)
In the Malthusian regime, the level of technology is very far from its limit so we assume
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the term
(
1− B(t)
Bm
)
is close enough to unity so we can approximate (15) by c0(y(t) −
s(y(t)))L(t)
B(t)
= c0(y(t)− s(y(t))) Xy(t) .
The population growth rate is, naturally, equal to the fertility rate minus the mortality
rate:
rL(t) =
∂L(t)
∂t
1
L(t)
= b(t)− µ(s(y(t))) = 1
e0
(y(t)− s(t))− µ(s(t)). (16)
From (14), we have that 1+ µ
′(s)
µ(s)
(y−s) = 0 and therefore µ(s) = −µ′(s)(y−s) which enables
us to rewrite (16) as follows: rL(t) = (y(t)− s(y(t)))
(
1
e0
+ µ′(s(y(t)))
)
.
The evolution of income is then characterized by (cf.(5))
ry(t) =
∂y(t)
∂t
1
y(t)
= rB(t)− rL(t) = (y(t)− s(y(t)))
(
c0
X
y(t)
− 1
e0
− µ′(s(y(t)))
)
(17)
The term (y(t)−s(t)) in (17) is always positive; the remaining term is strictly decreasing
with y from infinity to − 1
e0
, and is equal to zero at some unique value of y(t) = y0:
c0
X
y0
− 1
e0
− µ′(s(y0)) = 0. (18)
Therefore, y0 is the unique long-run time-invariant income level in the Malthusian regime.
Life expectancy in this regime is equal to 1
µ(s(y0))
; the population grows at the same rate as
the technology does, rL(t) = rB(t) = c0X
(
1− s(y0)
y0
)
≡ r0.
3.3.2. The demographic transition
As the population size L(t) hits the threshold q(L(t)) = c0
c
, the demographic transition
begins. The evolution of productivity is now characterized by
rB(t) = q(L(t))cX
(
1− s(y(t))
y(t)
)(
1− B(t)
Bm
)
, (19)
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while the evolution of population size is
rL(t) = (y(t)− s(y(t)))
(
(1− q(L(t))) c
c− c0
1
e0
+ µ′(s(y(t)))
)
(20)
As qc climbs above c0, the productivity growth accelerates while the population growth
(shortly) slows down, which results in increase in per-capita income y(t). Further develop-
ments depend on how the energy surplus y−s(y) responds to increases in income y; we make
the following
Assumption 1. ∂s(y)
∂y
< 1.
This assumption is true if the function µ(s) is sufficiently convex. For example, µ(s) =
As−α + δ, A > 0, α > 0, δ ≥ 0 results in ∂s
∂y
= αA
(α+1)(A+δsα)
< 1.
With Assumption 1, an income rise causes both technology and population growth to
accelerate. Thus, the overall effect of changing q and y is unambiguously positive for the
technological growth. Rising income also reduces mortality µ.
The effect on the birth rate b is ambiguous: on the one hand, greater q implies that a
smaller fraction of energy surplus is allocated towards fertility; on the other hand, the energy
surplus itself is rising. At the initial stages of demographic transition, we argue, the second
(positive) effect is likely to dominate, because a change in the level of q results in an increase
in the rate of growth of y, leading to an increase in the birth rate.
As the population growth accelerates, the process starts to feed on itself: a faster growing
L implies a faster growing q, which further implies a faster growing technology level and
increasing per-capita energy production. The latter contributes to further population growth,
but at a decreasing rate: with rising q, an ever-smaller fraction of energy surplus is allocated
towards new births. As a result, the effects of technological growth gradually shift from
predominantly increasing the population size to predominantly increasing the per-capita
productivity.
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Finally, as the level of technology rises high and starts to approach its limit, the tech-
nological growth slows down, causing both the population size and energy production per
capita to stabilize at some (high) level.
3.3.3. Time limit
In the time limit, the economy is characterized by the level of technology being equal to
its maximum Bm, and the population level being stabilized at some Lm so that the fertility
rate equals the mortality rate:
(ym − s(ym))
(
(1− q(Lm)) c
c− c0
1
e0
+ µ′(s(ym))
)
= 0. (21)
This, together with the definition of y, (cf.(5)) ym =
BmX
Lm
, allow to find the unique values of
Lm and ym.
Proposition 1. If the Malthusian rate of population growth r0 is slow enough, the time limit
income ym is greater than the Malthusian income y0.
Note that the Assumption 1 is not required for this result to be true.
Proof. From (21) and (18), it follows that
µ′(s(ym))− µ′(s(y0)) = 1
e0
[
1− c
c− c0 (1− q(Lm))
]
− c0X
y0
. (22)
By the definition of post-Malthusian regime, the term in square brackets in (22) is positive.
The Malthusian rate of growth is determined by the parameter c0; if it is small enough, the
right-hand side of (22) is positive, making the left-hand side to be positive, as well. The fact
that µ(·) is concave then implies that s(ym) > s(y0), which further implies ym > y0.
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4. Calibration
To illustrate how the model fits the observed pattern of the demographic transition, we
calibrate the model using the known history of population growth, birth and death rates.
We take the land stock X equal to the earth surface, roughly 510 million square kilome-
ters.4 The data on population levels is from the HYDE dataset (Klein Goldewijk et al., 2010,
2011). The dataset provides an estimate on the global population size from year 10000BC
until 2000AD, with time intervals decreasing from 1000 to 10 years.
We assume that the beginning of the demographic transition is year 1800, with population
L0 = 990 million people. To normalize the Malthusian per-capita energy production at
y0 = 1, we assume the technology level in that year is equal to B(1800) = B0 =
y0L0
X
=
1× 990/510 = 1.94.
We assume the mortality function takes the form µ(s) = As−α + δ, A > 0, α > 0,
which results in some optimal mortality prevention effort s(y). Clark (2008) estimates the
Malthusian death rate at µ0 = 0.03, thus we assume µ(s(y0)) = µ0 which implies δ =
µ0 − As(y0)−α.
The cultural openness function takes the form q(L) = L
γ
Lγ+θγ
, γ > 0, θ > 0. To ensure
that the demographic transition indeed begins in year 1800, it must be that q(L0) =
c0
c
.
Since the technology and population grow at the same rate during the Malthusian era,
we can match both to the known data on the population growth rate during that period.
According to the HYDE dataset, global population has risen from 461 to 990 million people
between years 1500 and 1800, which is consistent with the annual growth rate of b0 − µ0 =
0.0025, where b0 is the Malthusian birth rate. Therefore,
∂B(1800)
∂t
1
B0
= c0
(
1− s(y0)
y0
)
X =
4We include the water surface, as the world oceans can surely contribute to the production of energy in
various ways.
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b0 − µ0. We can then express the technological growth rate at any later date as follows:
∂B(t)
∂t
1
B(t)
= (b0 − µ0)q(L(t))
q(L0)
1− s(y(t))
y(t)
1− s(y0)
y0
(
1− B(t)
Bm
)
. (23)
The Malthusian birth rate must then be equal to b0 =
1
e0
(y0 − s(y0)), from which a later
birth rate b(t) can be derived: b(t) = (1−q(L(t))) c
c−c0
1
e0
(y(t)−s(y(t))) = b0 1−q(L(t))1−q(L0)
y(t)−s(y(t))
y0−s(y0) .
The remaining unknown parameters A,α, γ, θ, Bm are calibrated by matching the pre-
dicted demographic transition path to the following observations: global population size in
years 1960 and 2000 (from the HYDE dataset), global birth rate in 1960, global death rates
in years 1960 and 2000 (all from World Development Indicators). The resultant values are
A = 0.0153, α = 0.39, γ = 4.84, θ = 2095, Bm = 3669.
The results are illustrated in figure 1. Despite the fact that the model was calibrated
using only five bits of post-Malthusian data, it fits the observed demographic patterns fairly
well. The model predicts that the global population size will eventually level off at slightly
under 9 billion people; the per-capita energy production will be more than 200 times that
of the Malthusian era. At the same time, the fraction of energy allocated to own mortality
prevention will drop from 25% to 16%; the rest will be spent on new births and (largely) on
knowledge creation.
5. Discussion
The main goal of this paper was not to make accurate numerical predictions about
the demographic transition process, but to highlight an alternative (relative to the existing
literature) mechanism at work. To emphasize the novel elements of the mechanism, some
other elements have been deliberately simplified. For example, the model completely ignores
the population age structure and its effects on the birth and death rates, and all living
individuals at a point in time are assumed to be the same. Such simplification indeed
20
Figure 1: Predicted vs. observed elements of the demographic transition
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results in unrealistic predictions about some demographic elements. For example, the World
Development Indicators dataset estimates the death rate in 2012 at about 8 per 1000 people.
If all living individuals indeed faced the same risk of mortality, that would imply a life
expectancy of 125 years; the real figure (from the same dataset) is only 70.8 years. Unless
life expectancy indeed increases to 125 years, the death rate should increase in the future,
which is something our simple model cannot predict.
To address the issue, the endogenous population age structure can be introduced into
the model, along the lines of Robson and Kaplan (2003a). Individual energy production
per unit of land depends not only on land productivity, but also on personal productivity
which exogenously depends on age. Personal productivity is low in the young age, peaks
during adulthood, and declines with older age. As individuals maximize the expected energy
surplus, the individual mortality prevention effort should then rise during early childhood
and decline in the old age; the mortality rate should follow the opposite pattern. Since
members of the same cultural type share the same goal of increasing their type’s fitness,
energy transfers between more productive and less productive individuals are possible.
A further extension of the model could include endogenous human capital, whose increase
is often associated with the demographic transition. Suppose individual energy production
per unit of land depends, besides land productivity and personal productivity, on the amount
of endogenously accumulated human/somatic capital. Accumulation of human capital re-
quires the use of energy. Individuals then optimally accumulate some amount of such capital
in the young age. As the land productivity increases with technological progress, the ex-
pected energy surplus rises which induces individuals to accumulate more human capital.
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